The Incompatible Incentives of Opposition Coordination in Mixed-Member Majoritarian Systems: Evidence from Japan
- Tuesday, 8 February 2022 | 9:00 - 9:45 (JST)
- Zoom Meeting
- Hikaru Yamagishi Department of Political Science, Yale University
- Kenneth Mori MCELWAIN Professor, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo
I will start with an overview of the literature on electoral systems, mobilization, and persuasion. The theories of turnout and preference have been developed in “pure” electoral system contexts (i.e. single-seat districts or proportional representation systems). Next, I will introduce my theory, which extends the theory to mixed-member electoral systems, and specifically mixed-member majoritarian. From there, I identify the testable implications of the theory, which is about heterogeneous effects of voter engagement with democratic elections. I introduce the research design for the survey conducted in Japan and show the results. Finally, I discuss and conclude.
Hikaru Yamagishi is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Yale University studying comparative politics and comparative political economy. She has a special interest in Japan, where she examines various instances of economic and political market inefficiency and failure. Her dissertation explores the causes and consequences of one such example in the context of political party competition: problems of opposition coordination. Her research is multi-method. Yamagishi’s work is supported by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, the Council on East Asian Studies at Yale University,